The Role of Rivalry: Public Goods Versus Common-Pool Resources

by: Jose Apesteguia, Frank P Maier-Rigaud

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 5. (1 October 2006), pp. 646-663.

View FullText article

DOI, HighWire

Reviews [Write a review of this article]

There are no reviews of this article

Find related articles from these CiteULike users

guererk, hardin

Find related articles with these CiteULike tags

cpr, goods, no-tag, public, rivalry

Abstract

Despite a large theoretical and empirical literature on public goods and common-pool resources, a systematic comparison of these two types of social dilemmas is lacking. In fact, there is some confusion about these two types of dilemma situations. As a result, they are often treated alike. In line with the theoretical literature, the authors argue that the degree of rivalry is the fundamental difference between the two games. Furthermore, they experimentally study behavior in a quadratic public good and a quadratic common-pool resource game with identical Pareto-optimum but divergent interior Nash equilibria. The results show that participants clearly perceive the differences in rivalry. Aggregate behavior in both games starts relatively close to Pareto efficiency and converges quickly to the respective Nash equilibrium. 10.1177/0022002706290433

@article{citeulike:833563, abstract = {Despite a large theoretical and empirical literature on public goods and common-pool resources, a systematic comparison of these two types of social dilemmas is lacking. In fact, there is some confusion about these two types of dilemma situations. As a result, they are often treated alike. In line with the theoretical literature, the authors argue that the degree of rivalry is the fundamental difference between the two games. Furthermore, they experimentally study behavior in a quadratic public good and a quadratic common-pool resource game with identical Pareto-optimum but divergent interior Nash equilibria. The results show that participants clearly perceive the differences in rivalry. Aggregate behavior in both games starts relatively close to Pareto efficiency and converges quickly to the respective Nash equilibrium. 10.1177/0022002706290433}, author = {Apesteguia, Jose and Maier-Rigaud, Frank P. }, citeulike-article-id = {833563}, doi = {10.1177/0022002706290433}, journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution}, month = {October}, number = {5}, pages = {646--663}, posted-at = {2008-03-13 15:36:44}, priority = {2}, title = {The Role of Rivalry: Public Goods Versus Common-Pool Resources}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002706290433}, volume = {50}, year = {2006} }

RIS record

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:833563 TI - The Role of Rivalry: Public Goods Versus Common-Pool Resources JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution VL - 50 IS - 5 SP - 646 EP - 663 N2 - Despite a large theoretical and empirical literature on public goods and common-pool resources, a systematic comparison of these two types of social dilemmas is lacking. In fact, there is some confusion about these two types of dilemma situations. As a result, they are often treated alike. In line with the theoretical literature, the authors argue that the degree of rivalry is the fundamental difference between the two games. Furthermore, they experimentally study behavior in a quadratic public good and a quadratic common-pool resource game with identical Pareto-optimum but divergent interior Nash equilibria. The results show that participants clearly perceive the differences in rivalry. Aggregate behavior in both games starts relatively close to Pareto efficiency and converges quickly to the respective Nash equilibrium. 10.1177/0022002706290433 AU - Apesteguia, Jose AU - Maier-Rigaud, Frank PY - 2006/10/01/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002706290433 ER -

RIS BibTeX