A model of sequential effects in common pool resource dilemmas

@article{citeulike:2599187, abstract = {Experimental games are often used as models of social dilemmas in which small groups of players have unrestricted access to, and share, a common and finite resource of desirable goods in the absence of any binding coordination mechanism. Examples are fishing, hunting, and use of computational facilities. Experimental studies of social dilemmas employ different protocols of play that differ from each other in terms of the information available to the players when they register their requests from the common resource. In this study we focus on the sequential protocol, where each participant has complete information about his or her position and the total requests of the previous movers, and the positional protocol, where each player only knows his or her position, but has no information about the other's requests. Previous research has found a robust position effect: individual requests are inversely related to the players' positions in the sequence with the first mover requesting most, and the last mover requesting the least. In an attempt to characterize the nature and intensity of the position effect, we developed and tested a descriptive model with one free (individual specific) parameter. The parameter is estimated from the players' requests under the positional protocol (i.e. in the absence of any information about the other's requests) and, as such, quantifies the social norm of}, address = {University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong}, author = {Budescu, David V. and Au, Wing T. }, citeulike-article-id = {2599187}, doi = {10.1002/bdm.402}, journal = {Journal of Behavioral Decision Making}, keywords = {common\_pool}, number = {1}, pages = {37--63}, posted-at = {2008-03-26 17:00:06}, priority = {2}, title = {A model of sequential effects in common pool resource dilemmas}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.402}, volume = {15}, year = {2002} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2599187 TI - A model of sequential effects in common pool resource dilemmas JF - Journal of Behavioral Decision Making VL - 15 IS - 1 SP - 37 EP - 63 AD - University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong N2 - Experimental games are often used as models of social dilemmas in which small groups of players have unrestricted access to, and share, a common and finite resource of desirable goods in the absence of any binding coordination mechanism. Examples are fishing, hunting, and use of computational facilities. Experimental studies of social dilemmas employ different protocols of play that differ from each other in terms of the information available to the players when they register their requests from the common resource. In this study we focus on the sequential protocol, where each participant has complete information about his or her position and the total requests of the previous movers, and the positional protocol, where each player only knows his or her position, but has no information about the other's requests. Previous research has found a robust position effect: individual requests are inversely related to the players' positions in the sequence with the first mover requesting most, and the last mover requesting the least. In an attempt to characterize the nature and intensity of the position effect, we developed and tested a descriptive model with one free (individual specific) parameter. The parameter is estimated from the players' requests under the positional protocol (i.e. in the absence of any information about the other's requests) and, as such, quantifies the social norm of KW - common_pool AU - Budescu, David AU - Au, Wing PY - 2002/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.402 ER -