Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out

by: Juan C Cardenas, John Stranlund, Cleve Willis

World Development, Vol. 28, No. 10. (October 2000), pp. 1719-1733.

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Abstract

Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise that individuals are purely self-interested. Experimental evidence shows, however, that individuals do not typically behave this way; instead, they tend to strike a balance between self and group interests. From experiments performed in rural Colombia, we found that a regulatory solution for an environmental dilemma that standard theory predicts would improve social welfare clearly did not. This occurred because individuals confronted with the regulation began to exhibit less other-regarding behavior and made choices that were more self-interested; that is, the regulation appeared to crowd out other-regarding behavior.

@article{citeulike:2587857, abstract = {Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise that individuals are purely self-interested. Experimental evidence shows, however, that individuals do not typically behave this way; instead, they tend to strike a balance between self and group interests. From experiments performed in rural Colombia, we found that a regulatory solution for an environmental dilemma that standard theory predicts would improve social welfare clearly did not. This occurred because individuals confronted with the regulation began to exhibit less other-regarding behavior and made choices that were more self-interested; that is, the regulation appeared to crowd out other-regarding behavior.}, author = {Cardenas, Juan C. and Stranlund, John and Willis, Cleve }, citeulike-article-id = {2587857}, doi = {10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00055-3}, journal = {World Development}, keywords = {common\_pool}, month = {October}, number = {10}, pages = {1719--1733}, posted-at = {2008-03-25 23:20:36}, priority = {2}, title = {Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00055-3}, volume = {28}, year = {2000} }

RIS record

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2587857 TI - Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out JF - World Development VL - 28 IS - 10 SP - 1719 EP - 1733 N2 - Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise that individuals are purely self-interested. Experimental evidence shows, however, that individuals do not typically behave this way; instead, they tend to strike a balance between self and group interests. From experiments performed in rural Colombia, we found that a regulatory solution for an environmental dilemma that standard theory predicts would improve social welfare clearly did not. This occurred because individuals confronted with the regulation began to exhibit less other-regarding behavior and made choices that were more self-interested; that is, the regulation appeared to crowd out other-regarding behavior. KW - common_pool AU - Cardenas, Juan AU - Stranlund, John AU - Willis, Cleve PY - 2000/10// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00055-3 ER -

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