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Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institutionJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 51, No. 2. (June 2003), pp. 217-247.
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AbstractFor centuries, villages in the Alps employed a special system for managing their common properties. Individual users could inspect other users at their own cost and impose a predetermined sanction (a fine) when a free rider was discovered. The fine was paid to the user who found a violator. Experiments with the institutions demonstrate that this mechanism considerably improves efficiency of resource use. The classical model of identical selfish agents does not capture the data as well as a model with heterogeneous and linear other-regarding preferences. Altruism and especially potentially dysfunctional behavior, such as spite and mistakes, play important positive roles.
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