Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible

@article{citeulike:1077227, abstract = {Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by an external agent. One such situation may occur in relation to common pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ranges, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that appropriators in common pool resources develop credible commitments in many cases without relying on external authorities. We present findings from a series of experiments exploring (1) covenants alone (both one-shot and repeated communication opportunities); (2) swords alone (repeated opportunities to sanction each other); and (3) covenants combined with an internal sword (one-shot communication followed by repeated opportunities to sanction each other).}, author = {Ostrom, Elinor and Walker, James and Gardner, Roy }, citeulike-article-id = {1077227}, journal = {The American Political Science Review}, keywords = {common\_pool, punishment}, number = {2}, pages = {404--417}, posted-at = {2008-03-25 22:39:03}, priority = {2}, title = {Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1964229}, volume = {86}, year = {1992} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1077227 TI - Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible JF - The American Political Science Review VL - 86 IS - 2 SP - 404 EP - 417 N2 - Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by an external agent. One such situation may occur in relation to common pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ranges, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that appropriators in common pool resources develop credible commitments in many cases without relying on external authorities. We present findings from a series of experiments exploring (1) covenants alone (both one-shot and repeated communication opportunities); (2) swords alone (repeated opportunities to sanction each other); and (3) covenants combined with an internal sword (one-shot communication followed by repeated opportunities to sanction each other). KW - common_pool KW - punishment AU - Ostrom, Elinor AU - Walker, James AU - Gardner, Roy PY - 1992/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/1964229 ER -