Costly Signaling and Cooperation

by: Herbert Gintis, Eric ALDEN Smith, Samuel Bowles

Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 213, No. 1. (7 November 2001), pp. 103-119.

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Abstract

We propose an explanation of cooperation among unrelated members of a social group in which cooperation evolves because it constitutes an honest signal of the member's quality as a mate, coalition partner or competitor, and therefore results in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this manner. Our model is framed as a multi-player public goods game that involves no repeated or assortative interactions, so that non-cooperation would be a dominant strategy if there were no signaling benefits. We show that honest signaling of underlying quality by providing a public good to group members can be evolutionarily stable, and can proliferate in a population in which it is initially rare, provided that certain plausible conditions hold, including a link between group-beneficial signaling and underlying qualities of the signaler that would be of benefit to a potential mate or alliance partner. Our model applies to a range of cooperative interactions, including unconditionally sharing individually consumable resources, participating in group raiding or defense, and punishing free-riding or other violations of social norms.

@article{citeulike:349390, abstract = {We propose an explanation of cooperation among unrelated members of a social group in which cooperation evolves because it constitutes an honest signal of the member's quality as a mate, coalition partner or competitor, and therefore results in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this manner. Our model is framed as a multi-player public goods game that involves no repeated or assortative interactions, so that non-cooperation would be a dominant strategy if there were no signaling benefits. We show that honest signaling of underlying quality by providing a public good to group members can be evolutionarily stable, and can proliferate in a population in which it is initially rare, provided that certain plausible conditions hold, including a link between group-beneficial signaling and underlying qualities of the signaler that would be of benefit to a potential mate or alliance partner. Our model applies to a range of cooperative interactions, including unconditionally sharing individually consumable resources, participating in group raiding or defense, and punishing free-riding or other violations of social norms.}, author = {Gintis, Herbert and Smith, Eric A. L. D. E. N. and Bowles, Samuel }, citeulike-article-id = {349390}, doi = {10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406}, journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biology}, keywords = {cooperation, costly, econ, gintis, signaling}, month = {November}, number = {1}, pages = {103--119}, posted-at = {2007-05-28 07:10:59}, priority = {2}, title = {Costly Signaling and Cooperation}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406}, volume = {213}, year = {2001} }

RIS record

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:349390 L3 - citeulike-article-id:349390 TI - Costly Signaling and Cooperation JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology VL - 213 IS - 1 SP - 103 EP - 119 N2 - We propose an explanation of cooperation among unrelated members of a social group in which cooperation evolves because it constitutes an honest signal of the member's quality as a mate, coalition partner or competitor, and therefore results in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this manner. Our model is framed as a multi-player public goods game that involves no repeated or assortative interactions, so that non-cooperation would be a dominant strategy if there were no signaling benefits. We show that honest signaling of underlying quality by providing a public good to group members can be evolutionarily stable, and can proliferate in a population in which it is initially rare, provided that certain plausible conditions hold, including a link between group-beneficial signaling and underlying qualities of the signaler that would be of benefit to a potential mate or alliance partner. Our model applies to a range of cooperative interactions, including unconditionally sharing individually consumable resources, participating in group raiding or defense, and punishing free-riding or other violations of social norms. KW - cooperation KW - costly KW - econ KW - gintis KW - signaling AU - Gintis, Herbert AU - Smith, Eric AU - Bowles, Samuel PY - 2001/11/07/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406 ER -

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