The Political Economy of Privatization

@article{citeulike:2784865, abstract = {This paper provides an empirical analysis of the role of political institutions in privatization. Using panel data for 21 industrialized countries in the 1977-1999 period, first we show that the timing and extent of privatization is affected by political fragmentation and proportional elections. As theory predicts, in consensual democracies large-scale privatization appears to be delayed by a war of attrition among different veto players. Second, privatization seems strongly affected by partisan politics. Particularly, right-wing executives with re-election concerns design privatization to spread share ownership among domestic voters.}, author = {Bortolotti, Bernardo and Pinotti, Paolo and Feem}, citeulike-article-id = {2784865}, journal = {Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series}, keywords = {dipl1}, month = {June}, posted-at = {2008-05-11 20:16:12}, priority = {2}, title = {The Political Economy of Privatization}, url = {http://ssrn.com/abstract=418020}, year = {2003} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2784865 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2784865 TI - The Political Economy of Privatization JF - Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series N2 - This paper provides an empirical analysis of the role of political institutions in privatization. Using panel data for 21 industrialized countries in the 1977-1999 period, first we show that the timing and extent of privatization is affected by political fragmentation and proportional elections. As theory predicts, in consensual democracies large-scale privatization appears to be delayed by a war of attrition among different veto players. Second, privatization seems strongly affected by partisan politics. Particularly, right-wing executives with re-election concerns design privatization to spread share ownership among domestic voters. KW - dipl1 AU - Bortolotti, Bernardo AU - Pinotti, Paolo AU - Feem PY - 2003/June// UR - http://ssrn.com/abstract=418020 ER -