Evolutionary stable sets in mixed-strategist models

by: Bernhard Thomas

Theoretical Population Biology, Vol. 28, No. 3. (December 1985), pp. 332-341.

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Abstract

Evolutionary stable sets are used as an extension of the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). They have, as sets, essentially the same properties as ordinary ESSs. Here, ES sets are applied to the characterization of what will happen in an asexual population of mixed-strategists under frequency-dependent selection. Such a population will tend to establish some state, usually not a unique one, that belongs to an ES set. For an important class of widely used mixed-strategist models, ES sets are found to comprise just those population states that allow the possible behavioural acts to be equally successful, or, to put it more precisely, that establish an evolutionarily stable population strategy.

@article{citeulike:2580255, abstract = {Evolutionary stable sets are used as an extension of the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). They have, as sets, essentially the same properties as ordinary ESSs. Here, ES sets are applied to the characterization of what will happen in an asexual population of mixed-strategists under frequency-dependent selection. Such a population will tend to establish some state, usually not a unique one, that belongs to an ES set. For an important class of widely used mixed-strategist models, ES sets are found to comprise just those population states that allow the possible behavioural acts to be equally successful, or, to put it more precisely, that establish an evolutionarily stable population strategy.}, author = {Thomas, Bernhard }, citeulike-article-id = {2580255}, doi = {10.1016/0040-5809(85)90033-4}, journal = {Theoretical Population Biology}, keywords = {evolution, game}, month = {December}, number = {3}, pages = {332--341}, posted-at = {2008-03-24 10:41:43}, priority = {2}, title = {Evolutionary stable sets in mixed-strategist models}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(85)90033-4}, volume = {28}, year = {1985} }

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TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2580255 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2580255 TI - Evolutionary stable sets in mixed-strategist models JF - Theoretical Population Biology VL - 28 IS - 3 SP - 332 EP - 341 N2 - Evolutionary stable sets are used as an extension of the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). They have, as sets, essentially the same properties as ordinary ESSs. Here, ES sets are applied to the characterization of what will happen in an asexual population of mixed-strategists under frequency-dependent selection. Such a population will tend to establish some state, usually not a unique one, that belongs to an ES set. For an important class of widely used mixed-strategist models, ES sets are found to comprise just those population states that allow the possible behavioural acts to be equally successful, or, to put it more precisely, that establish an evolutionarily stable population strategy. KW - evolution KW - game AU - Thomas, Bernhard PY - 1985/12// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(85)90033-4 ER -

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