Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in a Sex- and Frequency-Dependent Selection Model

by: TAO Yi, Sabin Lessard, Mathieu Lemire

Journal of Theoretical Biology, Vol. 204, No. 2. (21 May 2000), pp. 191-200.

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diploid, evolution, game

Abstract

In this paper, a sex-dependent matrix game haploid model is investigated. For this model, since the phenotypes of female and male individuals are determined by alleles located at a single locus and are sex dependent, any given genotype corresponds to a strategy pair. Thus, a strategy pair is an ESS if and only if the allele corresponding to this strategy pair cannot be invaded by any mutant allele. We show that an ESS equilibrium must be locally asymptotically stable if it exists.

@article{citeulike:2580248, abstract = {In this paper, a sex-dependent matrix game haploid model is investigated. For this model, since the phenotypes of female and male individuals are determined by alleles located at a single locus and are sex dependent, any given genotype corresponds to a strategy pair. Thus, a strategy pair is an ESS if and only if the allele corresponding to this strategy pair cannot be invaded by any mutant allele. We show that an ESS equilibrium must be locally asymptotically stable if it exists.}, author = {Yi, T. A. O. and Lessard, Sabin and Lemire, Mathieu }, citeulike-article-id = {2580248}, doi = {10.1006/jtbi.2000.1098}, journal = {Journal of Theoretical Biology}, keywords = {diploid, evolution, game}, month = {May}, number = {2}, pages = {191--200}, posted-at = {2008-03-24 10:39:04}, priority = {2}, title = {Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in a Sex- and Frequency-Dependent Selection Model}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2000.1098}, volume = {204}, year = {2000} }

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TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2580248 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2580248 TI - Evolutionarily Stable Strategy in a Sex- and Frequency-Dependent Selection Model JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology VL - 204 IS - 2 SP - 191 EP - 200 N2 - In this paper, a sex-dependent matrix game haploid model is investigated. For this model, since the phenotypes of female and male individuals are determined by alleles located at a single locus and are sex dependent, any given genotype corresponds to a strategy pair. Thus, a strategy pair is an ESS if and only if the allele corresponding to this strategy pair cannot be invaded by any mutant allele. We show that an ESS equilibrium must be locally asymptotically stable if it exists. KW - diploid KW - evolution KW - game AU - Yi, TAO AU - Lessard, Sabin AU - Lemire, Mathieu PY - 2000/05/21/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2000.1098 ER -

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