Mon, 21 Jul 2008 00:14:37 BST CiteULike: hardins group_size http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/tag/group_size CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/1309321 <i>The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 3. (2001), pp. 663-672.</i><br /><br />According to the Olson paradox, larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering their interests. We address the issue in a model with three distinctive features: explicit intergroup interaction, collective prizes with a varying mix of public and private characteristics, and nonlinear lobbying costs. The interplay of these features leads to new results. When the cost of lobbying has the elasticity of a quadratic function, or higher, larger groups are more effective no matter how private the prize. With smaller elasticities, a threshold degree of publicness is enough to overturn the Olson argument, and this threshold tends to zero as the elasticity approaches the value for a quadratic function. We also demonstrate that these results are true, irrespective of whether we examine group sizes over the cross-section in some given equilibrium or changes in the size of a given group over different equilibria. Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox Joan Esteban Debraj Ray The American Political Science Review, Vol. 95, No. 3. (2001), pp. 663-672. 2007-05-19T17:29:31-00:00 2001 The American Political Science Review 95 3 663 672 group_size http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2515326 <i>The American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 2. (1974), pp. 707-716.</i> Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group Size John Chamberlin The American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 2. (1974), pp. 707-716. 2008-03-11T15:25:56-00:00 1974 The American Political Science Review 68 2 707 716 group_size http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2480876 <i>The American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 5. (1993), pp. 1317-1327.</i><br /><br />This paper presents an experimental test of the proposition that government contributions to public goods, funded by lump-sum taxation, will completely crowd out voluntary contributions. It is found that crowding-out is incomplete and that subjects who are taxed are significantly more cooperative. This is true even though the tax does not affect the Nash equilibrium prediction. This result is taken as evidence for alternative models that assume people experience some private benefit from contributing to public goods. An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis James Andreoni The American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 5. (1993), pp. 1317-1327. 2008-03-06T23:27:25-00:00 1993 The American Economic Review 83 5 1317 1327 group_size public_goods