Sat, 26 Jul 2008 00:34:29 BST CiteULike: hardins Stranlund http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/author/Stranlund CiteULike.org en-gb Copyright © 2004-2008 citeulike.org http://www.citeulike.org/user/hardin/article/2587857 <i>World Development, Vol. 28, No. 10. (October 2000), pp. 1719-1733.</i><br /><br />Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the premise that individuals are purely self-interested. Experimental evidence shows, however, that individuals do not typically behave this way; instead, they tend to strike a balance between self and group interests. From experiments performed in rural Colombia, we found that a regulatory solution for an environmental dilemma that standard theory predicts would improve social welfare clearly did not. This occurred because individuals confronted with the regulation began to exhibit less other-regarding behavior and made choices that were more self-interested; that is, the regulation appeared to crowd out other-regarding behavior. Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out Juan Cardenas John Stranlund Cleve Willis doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(00)00055-3 World Development, Vol. 28, No. 10. (October 2000), pp. 1719-1733. 2008-03-25T23:20:06-00:00 2000 World Development 28 10 1719 1733 common_pool