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<pubDate>Thu, 21 Aug 2008 14:50:09 BST</pubDate>


	<title>CiteULike: Kohs Thomas</title>
	<description>CiteULike: Kohs Thomas</description>


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<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/Koh/article/2580255">
    <title>Evolutionary stable sets in mixed-strategist models</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/Koh/article/2580255</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Theoretical Population Biology, Vol. 28, No. 3. (December 1985), pp. 332-341.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Evolutionary stable sets are used as an extension of the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). They have, as sets, essentially the same properties as ordinary ESSs. Here, ES sets are applied to the characterization of what will happen in an asexual population of mixed-strategists under frequency-dependent selection. Such a population will tend to establish some state, usually not a unique one, that belongs to an ES set. For an important class of widely used mixed-strategist models, ES sets are found to comprise just those population states that allow the possible behavioural acts to be equally successful, or, to put it more precisely, that establish an evolutionarily stable population strategy.</description>
    <dc:title>Evolutionary stable sets in mixed-strategist models</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Bernhard Thomas</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/0040-5809(85)90033-4</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Theoretical Population Biology, Vol. 28, No. 3. (December 1985), pp. 332-341.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-03-24T10:41:33-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1985</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Theoretical Population Biology</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>28</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>3</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>332</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>341</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>evolution</prism:category>
    <prism:category>game</prism:category>
</item>



<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/Koh/article/2580245">
    <title>Genetical ESS-models. II. Multi-strategy models and multiple alleles</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/Koh/article/2580245</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Theoretical Population Biology, Vol. 28, No. 1. (August 1985), pp. 33-49.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The problem of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in sexual populations can be investigated by means of genetical ESS-models which link common sense, phenotypic ESS-models to an underlying genetical system. Thorough results are obtained for multi-strategy models in diploid, panmictic populations on the basis of multi-allelic, one-locus systems. A sexual population will be maintained at a phenotypic ESS if this can possibly be produced by the genotypes currently existing. If there is enough allelic variation, the corresponding gene pool may either be an ESS itself, or belong to an attracting, continuous set of states, which all determine the same evolutionarily stable population. The latter case allows new alleles to enter and spread in the gene pool without disturbing the phenotypic ESS. If a phenotypic ESS cannot be established, ESSs of the genetical model may be found which give rise to stable populations alternatively. Since these depend on the phenotypes determined by the currently existing genotypes, they may be destabilized by the occurrence of new mutations. In this sense, they are less durable than populations maintained at a phenotypic ESS and can be expected to evolve, in the long run, towards a phenotypic ESS.</description>
    <dc:title>Genetical ESS-models. II. Multi-strategy models and multiple alleles</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Bernhard Thomas</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/0040-5809(85)90021-8</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Theoretical Population Biology, Vol. 28, No. 1. (August 1985), pp. 33-49.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-03-24T10:36:17-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1985</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Theoretical Population Biology</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>28</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>1</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>33</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>49</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>diploid</prism:category>
    <prism:category>evolution</prism:category>
    <prism:category>game</prism:category>
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<item rdf:about="http://www.citeulike.org/user/Koh/article/2580243">
    <title>Genetical ESS-models. I. Concepts and basic model</title>
    <link>http://www.citeulike.org/user/Koh/article/2580243</link>
    <description>&lt;i&gt;Theoretical Population Biology, Vol. 28, No. 1. (August 1985), pp. 18-32.&lt;/i&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) in phenotypic models are used to explain the evolution of animal interactive behaviour. As the behavioural features under consideration are assumed to be genetically determined, the question arises how underlying a genetical system might affect the results of phenotypic ESS-models. This question can be fully treated in terms of ESS-theory. A method of designing Genetical ESS-Models is proposed, which transfers the question of evolutionary stability to a &#34;lower&#34; level, the genetical basis. Genetical ESS-models -- although nonlinear even in the simplest cases -- can be analysed in a way that is familiar to ESS-theorists and yield immediate results on gene pool ESSs, which then may or may not maintain ESSs on the phenotypic level. Moreover, general results can be obtained to characterize evolutionarily stable gene pool states and their interrelation with commonsense, phenotypic ESSs. This part of the article presents the basic concepts and an outline of the method of genetical ESS-models. It gives, as a demonstration, a complete analysis for phenotypic two-strategy models (linear or nonlinear) based on a diploid, diallelic single-locus system under random mating. The results in this case suggest that a phenotypic ESS should indeed be expected to evolve but, maybe, only after passing through a succession of temporarily stable states.</description>
    <dc:title>Genetical ESS-models. I. Concepts and basic model</dc:title>

    <dc:creator>Bernhard Thomas</dc:creator>
    <dc:identifier>doi:10.1016/0040-5809(85)90020-6</dc:identifier>
    <dc:source>Theoretical Population Biology, Vol. 28, No. 1. (August 1985), pp. 18-32.</dc:source>
    <dc:date>2008-03-24T10:34:40-00:00</dc:date>
    <prism:publicationYear>1985</prism:publicationYear>
    <prism:publicationName>Theoretical Population Biology</prism:publicationName>
    <prism:volume>28</prism:volume>
    <prism:number>1</prism:number>
    <prism:startingPage>18</prism:startingPage>
    <prism:endingPage>32</prism:endingPage>
    <prism:category>diploid</prism:category>
    <prism:category>evolution</prism:category>
    <prism:category>game</prism:category>
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