Separation of Powers and Political Accountability

@article{citeulike:1633160, abstract = {Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, but they are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy. In this way, the two bodies discipline each other to the voters' advantage. Under appropriate checks and balances, separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information.}, author = {Persson, Torsten and Roland, Gerard and Tabellini, Guido }, citeulike-article-id = {1633160}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2951269}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, keywords = {poum}, number = {4}, pages = {1163--1202}, posted-at = {2007-09-08 05:47:02}, priority = {2}, title = {Separation of Powers and Political Accountability}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2951269}, volume = {112}, year = {1997} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1633160 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1633160 N2 - Political constitutions are incomplete contracts and therefore leave room for abuse of power. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials, but they are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps to prevent the abuse of power, but only with appropriate checks and balances. Checks and balances work by creating a conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature, yet requiring both bodies to agree on public policy. In this way, the two bodies discipline each other to the voters' advantage. Under appropriate checks and balances, separation of powers also helps the voters elicit information. IS - 4 JF - The Quarterly Journal of Economics EP - 1202 TI - Separation of Powers and Political Accountability VL - 112 SP - 1163 KW - poum AU - Persson, Torsten AU - Roland, Gerard AU - Tabellini, Guido PY - 1997/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2951269 ER -